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MENTOR

by Leo Philbert



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WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT (in preparation)
POINTERS TO THE WISE LIFE (in preparation)

These books, shortly to be published, present in a different way and develop the matters treated of in MENTOR. For this reason, they are as a complement of MENTOR. But, although they would be advantageously used in connection with MENTOR, they are in themselves independent books.

MENTOR

BY

LEO PHILBERT

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PREFACE

The subject of which this book treats deserves the consideration of the thoughtful mind for its practical usefulness. The matters have been presented in a systematic way, and, it is hoped, with precision and clearness. It has been the aim to make of this book a guide in life, an adviser: hence the title Mentor. The book is addressed to the student, but also to the general public. It is published with the wish that its perusal may prove as beneficial to the reader as the writing of it has been found useful to

LEO PHILBERT.

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MENTOR

I

HOW BEST TO ATTAIN TO KNOWLEDGE

Surrounded by objects which force themselves upon our consideration, and with which we are in a necessary relation, we naturally endeavor to know those objects. It is, therefore, important that we should be acquainted with the way which may best lead us to the attainment of that knowledge: this way lies in the proper handling of the faculty through whose operation we arrive at knowledge—the thinking faculty, called intellect or reason. This proper handling of the intellect comes from training; for the intellect is like a sense or a limb amenable to training. This training is imparted by rules formulated from man's experience. By these rules, thinking has been raised to an art.

Enter upon the surest way to knowledge by studying the art of thinking, and learning its rules.

II

APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF THE ART OF THINKING TO THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT ABOUT CERTAIN OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

Is that which you purpose to know, the *possibility* of a thing? Attend to the following rules. That a thing be possible, it must not be so out of the ordinary course of events as to oppose common sense; the terms by which the thing is defined must not be contradictory; if the thing is contrary to laws of nature, either it should appear that these laws are neutralized by others, or there should be a reasonable ground for thinking that the thing is due to laws which we do not know, or to the interaction of the several laws which we know.

Is that which you purpose to know the *existence* of a thing? Attend to the following rules. That a thing exists is founded on the testimony either of self or of others. Now, the testimony of self is derived from the impression an object makes on our senses. See if your senses are, owing to normal condition, qualified for being correctly impressed by objects, in order that from the impression received you may safely infer the existence of the object which produces the impression. Moreover, given that your senses are in such condition as to report correctly about objects, see that your mind itself is not hindered by preoccupation from

interpreting correctly their report: a preoccupied mind is liable to perceive not what the senses report but what itself under preoccupation creates; in this case sensation is had of an unreal object—the object as presented by sensation does not exist. Moreover, when needed, bring to bear upon the object of whose presence you are informed by one sense the action of other senses in order that through the comparison between the several reports of the various senses the report of that sense being either confirmed or corrected, you may conclude to the existence either of the object as apprehended by that sense, or of a different object as subsequently made out under the intervening action of the other senses.

When the object does not fall under the senses, the way to establish its existence is through the relation of dependence in which it stands to another object of whose existence the senses have made us cognizant. Now, that we may conclude to the existence of an object, phenomenon, event, from its relation of dependence to another, this relation of dependence must be a fact. But as we know two objects, phenomena, events to be in a relation of dependence only from their being found together or following each other, the point to be determined is whether coexistence or succession arise from their interdependence or not. Now, coexistence or succession are known to arise from the interdependence of two objects, phenomena, events when from adequate observation and experience it has become established that the two objects, phenomena, events are always found together or follow each other

either as cause and effect, or as co-effects of one common cause. Thus, from the fact that constant observation and experience teach the coexistence or succession of two objects, phenomena, events, you may conclude to a relation of dependence between them, and by reason of this dependence, you may from the existence of the one which falls under the senses infer the existence of the other which is removed from the senses.

A certain conduct of others is a fact or event, the existence of which like that of any other object may be ground for inquiry. To ascertain the existence of that conduct, consider whether there is between that conduct and that from which it is assumed to proceed relation of dependence as of effect to its cause. That from which conduct follows consists of the qualifications of the person and of the circumstances of the case in which the person is placed. That a relation of dependence between a given conduct and a person possessed of certain qualifications and placed in certain circumstances does exist, may be concluded to from the fact that coexistence and succession have been observed between that conduct and the person possessed of those qualifications when placed in those circumstances. But the question is whether the person placed in those circumstances has precisely the qualifications which joined to the circumstances go to make the cause from which the conduct results. From the fact that because I have those qualifications I would, in those circumstances have that conduct I cannot conclude that that person in those cir-

cumstances would have that conduct too; in so doing I would attribute my own conduct to another whom I see placed in those circumstances as if he had my qualifications, and this is precisely the question—whether his qualifications are exactly like mine. And supposing they were, are the circumstances in which he is placed such as I think they are? Since the circumstances are one of the two elements which go to make the cause of conduct, a difference of quality in this ingredient will bring a difference of quality in the compound, and a qualitatively different conduct will be the result. Therefore, on one hand the qualifications and on the other hand the case, of the person the existence of whose conduct I seek to make out must be the same as mine in order that from my conduct I may conclude to the conduct of that person. Supposing it were found that the qualifications of the person are different from mine, and in consequence that he must look at things differently, feel differently, and therefore act differently, then I would have to divest myself of my own qualifications and adapt his in order that I might know how he would act in given circumstances from the way I myself would act were I in his place. But how can another's qualifications be made out for what they really are? And given they could, how can I divest myself of mine to put on his? Hence the extreme caution we must use in concluding to the conduct of others; the conclusion can never be absolute.

That an object, phenomenon, event exists, is founded, besides the testimony of self, on the tes-

timony of others. The testimony of others is resorted to either for confirmation of the testimony of self or for taking its place when the testimony of self cannot be had owing to distance, either in place or in time, from the object, phenomenon, event. The testimony of others with respect to the distance in place is in the form of relations of travel, newspapers, etc.; with respect to the distance in time, it is in the form of history. Now, the credibility of the testimony of others depends on their being qualified for knowing the existence of the object, phenomenon, event, and on their having no intention either from passion or interest to tell different from what they know; not to be deceived and not to deceive are the two grounds of credibility. The existence of an object, phenomenon, event which others refer they may know of either on the testimony of self, or themselves on the testimony of others. That they might not be deceived on the testimony of self, have they conformed to the rules which guide the testimony of self? That they might not be deceived on the testimony of others have they put this testimony to the test of credibility? One might not allow himself to be deceived about what he is personally a witness of, and allow himself to be deceived on the testimony of another who has been that witness owing to the fact that that witness has been deceived or is deceiving.

Is that which you purpose to know the *nature* of a thing? Attend to the following rules. The nature of things is knowable up to a certain point;

beyond that point it is unknowable as shown by the futility of the efforts of self and of others to pass over that point. As the things we seek to know are of different orders or kinds, different shall be the method employed for attaining to the knowledge of them respectively. If the thing is to be perceived by the faculty of feeling, feeling alone is to be applied to it. If it is to be perceived by feeling conjointly with reason, both feeling and reason are to be applied in the measure corresponding to each. If feeling here is not a factor of knowledge it must not take part in the process by which the knowledge of the thing is arrived at. To allow feeling to meddle with the operation of reason to which the working out of that knowledge pertains is to cause the operation of reason to be hindered in proportion to the measure of the interference; on account of this hindrance, the result of the operation will be different from what it would have been had not the hindrance occurred; in other words, the knowledge of the thing shall be different according as feeling is kept out of or admitted conjointly with reason into, the operation: for a change has taken place not in the thing itself but in the perceptive agent who in the first case perceived the thing only by reason, whereas in the second by feeling besides. The feeling arises from an impression made by the thing itself or by circumstances, the impression causing attraction towards or repulsion from, the thing: in this attraction or repulsion the feeling (also called passion) consists. The circumstances may be state of health, atmospheric

condition, age, social position, interest in or sympathy for, others, etc. To attempt to get at the knowledge of the thing when under an impression from any of these sources is to become liable to give to feeling admittance into the operation which pertains to reason alone. Enter upon the process when not under an impression, either before it is received or after it is passed. When made outside of interference on the part of feeling, the process of reason will lead you to the knowledge of the thing—to a true notion, idea, of it. Having thus acquired the knowledge of the thing, henceforth guide yourself—even when under an impression to the contrary—by your opinion of it, as derived from and based on, that knowledge. You will then act in accordance to what the thing is, not to what it is assumed to be. In the first case your conduct from its responding to a true idea of the thing will be right; in the second, from its responding to an erroneous idea, it will be wrong.

These rules obtain especially with regard to the knowledge of the end which one proposes to himself, and of the means by which he may compass that end. Feeling may suggest the end, and move towards making a more effective use of the means conducive to its attainment, but the process of determining and knowing the end and the means to the end pertains to reason alone. Here, however, more than anywhere else, feeling is more apt to interfere with reason, causing misapprehension and error—the more detrimental, the more practical is the knowledge involved.

III

EXAMINATION INTO THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT WITH RULES FOR GUIDANCE IN ITS OPERATION, AND PRACTICAL REMARKS ABOUT A PART THEREOF

The operation by which the intellect searches after knowledge consists of observation and experiment, and, on the facts furnished by these, of reasoning either by induction or deduction for the drawing of a conclusion.

The difference between observation and experiment is that in observation the object of knowledge is naturally placed under the operation of the intellect; in experiment it is so placed by man's interference: this artificial bringing of objects for experimentation leads to a knowledge which might not otherwise be arrived at, the occasion for observation being wanting.

Once the object is known, in this knowledge a fact or truth has been acquired. Upon the truths acquired from observation and experiment the intellect operates through reasoning for the drawing of a conclusion which will convey a further truth. In reasoning, therefore, the intellect proceeds from that which it knows to that which it purposes to know. When from the truth about particular objects it concludes to a general truth, the reasoning is by induction; when from a general truth it con-

cludes to the truth about a particular object, the reasoning is by deduction. Of the truths the statement of which forms the propositions which as premises in syllogism (the form of the reasoning by deduction), are the ground for deduction, one, the predicate of the middle term, was acquired through induction; the other—the belonging of the subject to the middle term as a member to a class—through observation and experiment.

In order that the process of reasoning may be carried out correctly, attend to the following rules. Since in the reasoning by induction the inference is made from the truth about particular objects to a general truth, in order that the thing inferred or the generalization may be true, take care that the inference is warranted by a sufficient number of facts; that no claim is made which the facts do not justify; that the facts are interpreted for what they really are. If the facts on which the generalization rests are too few, or if, among the many facts adduced, some are only assumed, then the generalization is not well established, and an inference cannot safely be drawn. And since in the reasoning by deduction or syllogism the inference is made from the relation in which both the predicate and the subject are known to stand to the middle term or class to that which must exist between the subject and the predicate, take care that the subject and the predicate are compared severally with the same middle term or class.

The following remarks about syllogism will help

towards a clearer understanding of this part of the operation of the intellect and of its relation to knowledge.

Since the conclusion that subject and predicate agree with each other is based on the fact that it has been found that the predicate and the subject severally agree with the middle term or class, syllogism is not for invention, but for drawing inferences from invention: the only thing it may lay a claim to is that it makes explicitly known in the conclusion what was implicitly known in the premises. It does not discover a new truth; it simply presents in a clear light the truth already acquired but felt rather than seen. Hence the use of syllogism is not for the acquisition of truth but for the presentation to self or others of the truth acquired. Do you wish to gain a clearer knowledge of your statements or of the statements of others? Use with regard to them syllogistic reasoning consciously after having used it unconsciously; go over the ground reflectively after having covered it instinctively. For syllogistic reasoning is an unconscious, instinctive operation of the intellect rooted in its very nature—an operation which is the same as to kind in all men, and different only as to degree in each individual according to the native power of his intellect and the effectiveness exercise and training have imparted to it.

Besides presenting with clearness the truth, syllogism procures to the intellect exercise in the rea-

soning operation, an exercise of such virtue that whosoever be desirous of having his reasoning powers at their best cannot afford to neglect the study and cultivation of syllogism.

IV.

HOW TO READ IN ORDER TO DERIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM WHAT IS READ

In language, knowledge is stored up. The words of which language is made of are embodied ideas; and by means of these ideas are presented to the imagination a concrete object whether single or composite—an image, and to the intellect a concept whether single or made up of subordinate concepts—a thought. The image is conveyed in description and narration; the thought in statement. In your reading you must start with a perception of the ideas expressed by the words—an understanding of the meaning of the words used. To discover the meaning of a new word is to acquire a new idea, and to that extent to enlarge one's knowledge. But to become acquainted with the meaning of a new word does more than to enlarge one's knowledge through the acquisition of the idea it expresses; it also enables one to fully grasp either the image or the thought which the word contributes to present; from the fact that the meaning of a word is ignored the image will be blurred and the thought obscured.

Assuming that the meaning of all the words used for presenting either an image or a thought is known, the method to be employed for obtaining a correct perception of either the image or the

thought and through them of the feeling which they are calculated to produce will be as follows: And first let your mind be entirely occupied in the image of the thing described or narrated, or in the thought stated: attention is a prerequisite for further process. Then, as to the image: according as the image is single or composite the apprehension will be of it simply or of its component parts simultaneously; as to the thought: according as the thought is single or made up of subordinate thoughts in the relation of parts to a whole, the apprehension likewise will be of it simply or of its component parts in the relation they hold one to another, and all to the main thought they concur to form, simultaneously.

Once you have apprehended the image or the thought as presented to you, and experienced the feeling they give rise to, consider whether the image or the thought is, with regard to its object, true; and given it is found to be true, consider whether it is rightly presented in itself or in relation with the feeling it was meant to cause, or whether there is not a better way of presenting it. For a writer perceives and expresses his perceptions only as far as he is able, and his ability is dependent on his mental power as to perceiving and as to expressing what he has perceived, into which enters his command of the language which he uses as his instrument of expression. His reader from being better qualified for perceiving or expressing might perceive and express better than he does. Be the case what it may with you, once

you have grasped the image or the thought of the writer, abstract it from the words in which he expresses it, the form in which he presents it, and study it thus in itself; once you have mastered it, express it in your own words, and present it to yourself in the form you yourself give to it. Then you will have made it your own; you will have assimilated it. And of what you read only that which you assimilate is truly food for your mind. Then compare it with that which you already knew on the subject to determine whether it is a new truth or only the truth that you knew under a different guise, or viewed from a different standpoint; in the latter case, that which you know will gain in extension and clearness; in the former, you will have added to your store of knowledge.

V

HOW TO IMPART TO OTHERS THE KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED

Since knowledge is presented through language, first you must use the words best calculated to express your ideas from among those with which your hearer or reader is supposed to be acquainted. In these words shall be presented the object of knowledge to that of the faculties—whether imagination or feeling or intellect—by which from its nature, it is to be perceived. The presentation is to be made according as the perception is had; in other words, the process by which the perception of the object is effected must be followed in the presentation of the object for perception. An image you present according as the object itself impressed it on your mind; and if, in presenting it, your purpose be not so much to give a mental view of the object as to produce in the hearer or reader the feeling which, in presence of the object, you have yourself experienced, in the image shall be delineated those features of the object which awakened in you that feeling. A thought you present according as it has been elaborated through the thinking process.

But the presentation of an image—be it for the purpose of affording simply a mental view of the object, or of causing the feeling the object arouses—

and of a thought must be adapted to the perceptive power of the faculties concerned in the hearer or reader as resulting from the native build of his mind, and the capability or perception his mind has acquired through exercise and training. And in the case of a thought his disposition towards it must, moreover, be taken into account in order that the proper form in which to make the presentation be adopted. This disposition may be either simple ignorance, or disbelief or apathy. If simple ignorance, presentation will be made in the form of exposition for instruction; if disbelief, of argumentation for convincing; if apathy, of persuasion for moving to accept and act up to, what has been shown either through exposition or argumentation to be the truth. The instructing in exposition you impart by stating the thought; the convincing you effect by adducing the proofs which support the thought and refuting the reasons against it; the persuading by setting forth the considerations that influence the will for action—the reasonableness of adopting what one knows to be the truth, and of acting up to it, and on one hand the advantages to be derived, and on the other the detriment to be avoided, from so doing: that is, you employ with regard to others the same process you have made use of with regard to yourself as to knowing the truth, and, the truth once known, as to persuading yourself to embrace it and to act up to it.

VI

RELATIVE USEFULNESS OF THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

The usefulness of an object of knowledge is measured by the bearing it has upon man's welfare. Now, man's welfare is more directly and immediately connected with and dependent upon, the knowledge of health, of making a living, of morals and of the world in general.

Is it not natural that the first object which must call man's attention for study should be himself—that individualized mass of matter or body in and through which the cosmic force operating constitutes a living being? The component parts of his body and the body as a whole—an organism or machine for the process of life; the conditions required for this process to be carried on normally in the body, so that from the normal process a state of health ensue—disease being no other than an interference, from any cause, with the normal process of life, how interference from certain causes with the life process may be prevented and disease warded off, or disease having taken hold of the body how it may be removed, and, the normal process being reestablished, health restored; how, the principal causes of interference with the process of life and consequently of disease being in the quality of the food eaten, of the water drunk, and of the air

breathed, to determine what must be the food, the water and the air that they may be conducive to and not destructive of, a normal process of life; when and under what conditions the reproductive functions may be performed so as to be not detrimental but beneficial both to the two concurring individuals and to their offspring, and how when born the child may be best reared, these and other points of the physical life present themselves first to your consideration for you to acquire of them the knowledge which their importance requires.

The essential need of man as a living being is to furnish to his body materials by which its substance worn out and eliminated in the process of life may be repaired. These materials are contained in the food in the two-fold form of solid and liquid. Covering and shelter and physiologically accidental needs of the body dependent on climate, but sociologically they have also become essential inasmuch in a civilized country man cannot, even if the climate should permit of it, live naked and houseless. These are therefore the means of subsistence which man has to provide for. The way in which they may be procured, and in that way how best the procuring of them may be effected is the next object of knowledge.

One might raise his food-stuff, make his covering, build his shelter. But in civilized society where division of labor obtains it is more advantageous to limit one's self to one pursuit. If that pursuit be the raising or manufacturing of products, the products will be of one class, or, in that class, of

one kind; and the products one raises or manufactures he will exchange with products raised or manufactured by others through the medium of exchange—money. First, then, know the class, and, in the class, the kind of products you are to raise or manufacture. This you determine by examining into the nature of the soil or the sources of supply of the raw material, the means of transportation, the demand, etc. Next, know how best to raise or manufacture your products, and finally how best to exchange them. The raising or manufacturing and exchanging of products is an art and art is founded on science. Be acquainted with the rules of the art, and the principles of the science on which the art rests. Instead of raising or manufacturing products, one may hire his services in the form of labor, trade, profession. What kind of labor, what trade or profession you are fit for, know from a consideration of your physical constitution, mental capacity, aptitude, talent, inclination.

The making of a living in a society is subordinated to the economic conditions obtaining in that society: know how to make the best of those conditions.

Learn to so supply your wants as to have something left over after your wants have been satisfied; and this residue learn to cause to produce by investing it wisely. There is an art of saving and an art of investing. And saving and investing what is saved is the road to competency and wealth.

On being born, man finds himself member of a society—first, the family, and later the community,

made up of the several families as units. From the fact that he is member of a society his action is necessarily restricted by the action of the other members, as theirs by his. Without this restriction society could not exist. For the curtailing of his individual action man is amply conpensated by the advantages which society affords him in the security against the encroachments of others, and in the help from the co-operation of others. Now, in the restriction of the action of the individual members of a society with regard one to another consist their respective duties and rights; for where there is a duty for one there is a right for another; right and duty are correlative. These rights and duties constitute morals. The determining of these rights and duties has been elaborated by the experience of the race in its endeavors to adjust the relations of men living in society so as to best secure the existence of society and its end—the welfare of its component members. Once effected, this determining of rights and duties establishes a rule of conduct for all the members of the social body. This rule of conduct is set forth in maxims, customs, laws. Here is, therefore, an object of knowledge for the man living in society—his rights from others, his duties to others. To arrive at that knowledge he has to study the rules of conduct as set forth in the maxims, customs and laws and apply them to the cases they cover, and as to those they do not, to take guidance from them. This is the work of the intellect: from the rule of conduct the intellect makes out the rights and the duties accord-

ing to the relation he stands to others. The mental state of one who has arrived at this knowledge is conscience. Since the requisite for one to do his duty to others is to be aware of that duty, you may see how important it is for men living in society to know their respective rights and duties with that habitual knowledge which makes one ready for action when called upon to act—that knowledge which is had in conscience.

How to live in conformity to the laws of the physical life for bodily welfare; how to procure the means of subsistence according to the economic conditions of the community in which one is placed; how to act up to the requirements of the social life in order that the society be maintained and fulfil its end—the welfare of its component members, these are practical objects which every man is bound to know to a greater or lesser extent under pain of dropping out of the race of life. There is another knowledge more speculative, but which on certain points mingles with the practical. As the three preceding knowledges are of man as a being that lives, struggles for existence and moves in society, so the present is of man as a philosopher who endeavors to know things irrespective of the bearing they have on his welfare, outside of the satisfaction of solving the questions of an inquisitive mind and of discovering the truth about things. It is by seeking after this knowledge that man particularly shows himself a rational being, occupying a higher plane of mentality than the rest of the living beings. For living beings up the scale of

life have knowledge of what the requirements of the physical life are, of how to procure the means of subsistence, and—in the case of many—of how to live together for mutual protection and help, but man raises himself above them by considering things in their nature, their relation, their phenomena, with a view of knowing them for what they are, and thus of arriving at the reason of things. This philosopher's search after knowledge is indulged in only by a few. As used to the sun and the starry heavens, to the succession of night and day and of the seasons we seldom stop to consider what they teach us, in like manner used as we are to the contact with our fellow men in business pursuits, social duties and pleasures, we do not ask ourselves what man is, what society is, what civilization is, how man came to be what he is to-day. We are too engrossed by occupation to rise to this philosophical disquisition, we fail to realize its worth, we are more fond of being amused than instructed. But you, if it be not your profession to pursue this study, devote at least some of your leisure to it. In this study you have helpers: scientists discover laws of nature, savants unearth facts: they work for you; they furnish you materials for you to work upon along this line of study. In the intellectual as in the material field, division of labor obtains, making for progress toward a larger truth. Erudition is but the means of a philosopher's knowledge. Of little use is erudition alone if it leads not to that knowledge. Of what use are, for instance, dates, places, events of history, if not connected with so-

ciety, its state, civilization, and this for making out human nature as revealed by its action? What nobler use can man make of his intellect than in getting at the reason of things? And what higher enjoyment can he pretend to than that derived from the possession of such a knowledge? This was the enjoyment the Roman poet longed after: *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.**

* Happy he who can discover the reason of things.—*Virgil.*

VII

DISCIPLINE TOWARDS CONDUCT

Acted upon by the surrounding objects, and moved by the passions which the impression made by the objects has aroused, keep the passions within the bounds of their office. This office is to awaken reason to the consideration of the object which makes the impression, and to be subservient to reason in the line of action which reason may determine upon with regard to the object.

The passions which the impression from an object arouses are either desire which moves toward the object, or fear which moves away from it. Awakened by the passions, reason proceeds to consider whether really the object is to be desired or feared. If found not to be desired or feared, reason warns the passions to cease and "be still," there being no cause for their exercise; if found to be desired or feared, reason determines whether it may be attained or removed, or not; in the first case reason bids the passions to lend their aid toward its attainment or removal; in the second, it enjoins upon the passions to desist from acting, and calls fortitude into exercise for the foregoing of the unattainable enjoyment or for the suffering of the unavoidable hurt—the enjoyment being perhaps unattainable simply from its being forbidden; the hurt

unavoidable simply from its being connected with an imperative duty.

Not only from a present object through the senses, but also from an absent object through memory and imagination the impression that arouses the passions of desire or fear is made. And not only a concrete but also an abstract object may cause that impression, the impression here coming through the intellect that has discovered that the abstract object is to be desired or feared. Desire or fear of an abstract object presented by the intellect may operate as a motive for or a deterrent from, certain acts. One will be moved to do an act by the attraction of the beauty the act reveals, or by the desire of the advantages it procures; and he will be deterred from doing an act by the repulsion its ugliness causes, and by the fear of the detriment it entails. Attractive beauty and repulsive ugliness on one hand, and on the other advantage to be gained or detriment to be avoided, are abstract objects which the intellect presents for moving to or deterring from, doing certain acts according as those acts have either beauty or ugliness, and bring about either advantage or detriment. Take the case of morals. The beauty of right or the ugliness of wrong, and the advantage or detriment found in doing right or wrong from the exercise about it of the self, social and religious sanctions in the form of approbation or censure with the concomitant effective reward or punishment, respectively move to do what is right and deter from doing what is wrong.

Discriminate the elements that enter into the process of human conduct, allow each to play the part assigned to it by nature, and to play it in the order nature has determined, and derive guidance and help for action from the motives presented to you by the intellect; this is the discipline towards conduct; embrace it. This discipline man must have if he wants his conduct to be rational. Without this discipline man is moved hither and thither under the impulse of ungoverned passions as the waves of the sea, but with it, he remains firm *"as rocks resist the billows and the sky."**

* Goldsmith.

VIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

Man is one of the innumerable forms which became individualized portions of the universal substance from their being independent centres of energy. These forms exist only for a time; they are like bubbles on the ocean of matter. And in the brief period of their existence they continually change because they are continually in motion: they go through the cycles through which all individualized mass of matter—be it star or organic body—passes—the cycles of birth, youth, maturity, decrepitude and death. In death the centre of energy is destroyed: the personal existence of the individual vanishes; but the elements of its body liberated by the cessation of the centre of energy return to the universal substance, thence to be drawn to enter into another individualized form as its components.

On coming into existence as a human individual you are ruled by this law of matter. Do not rebel against it, but rather make the best of the cycle through which you are passing. Each cycle has its own advantages and charms though different from those of the preceding or succeeding cycle, as are different the advantages and charms of the various seasons in the year.

Since you are but one of the numberless individ-

ualized forms which make up the world, study yourself in connection with them, and particularly with those to whom you are more closely allied by reason of a greater similarity of nature: thus will you be better enabled to know what behavior comports with what you are. This behavior is to conform to the laws by which are governed, according to their respective nature, all the forms into which portions of the universal substance became, from having their own centre of energy, individualized. By these laws man is governed as to his physical, mental, moral, social and religious life. The conformity to these laws for man consists in acquiescing in their operation, however he may have to suffer from it; and in doing what they require, however hard the doing may be. On this two-fold conformity to these laws depends your happiness; do not look for real happiness outside of the order established by these laws. And within this order, take care that you do not mar the happiness coming to you by regrets about the past, fears about the future, desires of to you unattainable objects. Regrets may be for mistakes made or for pleasures gone; regrets will not rectify the mistakes nor bring the pleasures back. Fears may be of possible evils or of certain death: fears will not remove evils that are to come, and evils are feared which will never come; and as to death, supposing it to be feared, will your fear of it lessen the certainty of it? But is death to be feared? Death is but a natural event; it is in the plan of nature; it is, like birth, an act—the closing act—of the drama of life:

death in itself is not to be feared. Therefore, both by regrets about the past and fears about the future you detract without cause from the happiness you would otherwise enjoy. And likewise do you detract from your happiness by a desire of that which is to you unattainable. An ungratified desire is a source of pain. Divert your mind from the object which for being unattainable dooms the desire which it awakens to remain ungratified: privation is not felt when not known.

Besides securing the essential happiness in conforming to nature's laws as to the physical, mental, moral, social and religious life, and taking care not to mar this happiness by sterile regrets about the past, vain fears about the future and futile desires of unattainable objects, cull on your way all that which may procure you an accidental happiness, as amusements, travel, knowledge, arts, friendship, making others happy. Short is the time of your existence; once gone you shall never return: be happy while you may. Happiness is within your reach, it is in your power—if you only look where it is—to possess it, and to possess it not to-morrow but to-day. Be not the man who " . . . *is never but always to be, blessed.*"*

* Pope.

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